(Note: After posting this piece, I had an email exchange with Peter Byrne. I am adding some of the information he provided, in his words, and responding as well. New material can be found by searching for the words “new material”. I also moved the disclosure statement to the top of the post. In many ways this post is now moot, as Byrne clarified what he meant in his article–see here.)

One of the few downsides of the Internet age is that inaccurate information and completely unsubstantiated allegations can be dressed up as an “investigative” expose and then be recycled over and over, regardless of how wildly unfounded they are. Such is the case with this piece that ran in some small California weeklies that, on the basis of what appears to be no evidence at all, alleges serious ethical improprieties by Sen. Dianne Feinstein. The story has been recycled by David Keene, who writes a column for the Hill, and subsequently picked up by various blogs. I should note right away (this disclosure was originally at the bottom of this lengthy piece) that I got interested in this story because it prominently mentions the Sunlight Foundation’s co-founder, Michael Klein. Mike can speak for himself (as he already did in response to the article). I limited my review to the central allegation of the article, and asked whether I as an editor would publish it on the basis of the evidence presented. I wouldn’t.

The piece’s author, a freelance journalist named Peter Byrne, alleges that, “Two defense contractors whose interests were largely controlled by her husband, financier Richard C. Blum, benefited from decisions made by Feinstein as leader” of the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Subcommittee (MILCON), part of the Senate Appropriatins Committee. To substantiate this allegation, he misrepresents or mischaracterizes both the transcripts of MILCON hearings, and information gleaned from the Web sites and press releases of the companies in question. He consistently distorts the plain meaning of words or omits key information and context in his effort to suggest scandal. But don’t believe me — read the rest for yourself, and see whether Byrne’s central allegation — “Two defense contractors whose interests were largely controlled by her husband, financier Richard C. Blum, benefited from decisions made by Feinstein as leader” of MILCON — can be substantiated by the examples Byrne cites. Unlike the publication for which he wrote his article, I’m providing links to all the committee transcripts and press releases and other information I cite. I leave it to readers to draw their own conclusions.

First allegation: At a MILCON hearing in 2001, Feinstein interrogated defense officials about the details of constructing specific missile defense systems, which included upgrading the early warning radar system at Cobra Dane radar on Shemya Island, Alaska. In 2003, Perini reported that it had completed a contract to upgrade the Cobra Dane radar system. It has done similar work at Beale Air Force Base in California and in the United Kingdom. URS also bids on missile defense work.

Byrne leaves out a great deal of information about this subject that appears in the hearing transcript, most importantly, that the money to pay for the project would come out the Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RTD&E) budget, not MILCON:

Senator Feinstein. I wanted to begin, if I might, with Dr. Sanders. I understand there are no MILCON funds for Fort Greely in the 2002 budget; is that correct?

Dr. Sanders. That is correct.

Senator Feinstein. But there are funds in the 2001 budget?

Dr. Sanders. That is correct.

Senator Feinstein. Could you explain to me why a decision was made to use research and development funds instead of MILCON to construct the missile defense testbed which is now going to be at the initial deployment site at Fort Greely?

Dr. Sanders. The Department believes that the testbed facility should be funded with RDT&E, reflecting the reality that the testbed is a research and development effort, and as such the cost of constructing the testbed should be included in the cost as a research and development cost of developing a ground-based midcourse missile defense system. The RDT&E funding will provide the needed flexibility to make the required changes to the testbed that we identify through testing in this realistic environment.

Later in the same hearing, we learn that the Shemya Island facility will be funded with RDT&E funds:

Dr. Sanders. We have really determined that aspects of the testbed project clearly fall within Title 10, Code 2353 authority, and use of and RDT&E funding would be authorized. There are some aspects of the testbed that could be viewed as having general utility and therefore are not authorized for RDT&E funding. But neither the statute nor the legislative history have a clear definition of “general utility.” So in order to clarify that, the Department has proposed legislation that would clarify the authority to construct a testbed to include some facilities that might be considered general utility with RDT&E funds.

Senator Feinstein. What are those facilities?

Dr. Sanders. The ones that might be considered general utility?

Senator Feinstein. Right.

Dr. Sanders. I would hesitate to say right now because that is an ambiguous area, but it could be, for example, at one aspect of the testbed it is an upgrade to the radar, the Cobra Dane radar in Shemya, the upgrade to the radar’s software. It is not even a construction element. But there is an upgrade to the power plant needed there in order to support that radar, and that might or might not be considered general utility.

Byrne didn’t bother to check it, but the MILCON committee approved the shift to RDT&E for the missile defense program:

To help make up the services’ urgent shortfall in funding, the Committee recommends that the unobligated balance of $55,030,000 remaining in the fiscal year 2001 Defense-wide account, “National Missile Defense Initial Deployment Facilities Phase 1,” be rescinded and that the funds be reallocated to the base realignment and closure account, part IV, specifically to offset the Navy and Air Force BRAC environmental shortfalls. The Committee recommends this offset as a result of the Department’s decision to shift the proposed national missile defense construction program from military construction into research, test, development, and evaluation.

It is also worth noting that the contract to upgrade the Shemya Island facility was awarded to Raytheon, not Perini Corporation. Did Feinstein also have influence over the decisions that contractors made about their subcontractors?

Raytheon hired Perini for both Shemya Island and the Beale Air Force Base projects, which can clearly be read here:

Perini Corporation has completed design and construction contracts for Raytheon Electronic Systems at Beale Air Force Base in California, the Cobra Dane facility on Shemya Island, Alaska and at a radar facility in England. The projects are all part of the Upgraded Early Warning Radar Element of the overall Ground-based Midcourse Defense program.

Perini applyied directly to Raytheon, not the federal government, for the work. And “Ground-Based Midcourse Defense program” is another name for missile defense–again, paid for with RDT&E funds, not those from MILCON.

New Material: This was probably the most contentious single item raised during our email exchange. Byrne argued MILCON approved requests for funding submitted on 1391 forms — which are detailed requests from the military that omit the names of contractors — for Cobra Dane and Beale Air Force Base. He also told me that he wrote a sidebar on this subject, which was not published**, which he offered to share it with me on background, an offer he soon withdrew:

i am not going to give you the sidebar, but just so you know, so that you can better do your own homework: the milcon-approved cobra dane and beale missile defense systems, as Saunders [SIC] indicated, were funded by milcon, not r&d funds. without seeing the 1391 forms you probably wouldn’t have been able to figure that out. not that any of this matters in terms of what i wrote, because the point is that the seantor was involved in deciding how to fund these projects, and the rest is history.

I’m not sure that he accurately characterizes Sanders’ testimony (see above), and I’m not sure about the funding issue (again, see the MILCON committee report quoted above). But assuming he’s right about both, there is another problem I raised–that Raytheon was the prime contractor seeking the Cobra Dane business. My last email to him read,

In the Cobra Dane example, I think you’re missing some crucial information. You’re assuming that Klein would have informed Feinstein about any subcontracts that Perini sought from other companies like Raytheon. He didn’t, because Perini wouldn’t be seeking business from the government. Feinstein couldn’t possibly have a conflict because it was Raytheon that awarded the business. So she would have been in the dark about Perini bidding on a Raytheon RFP, just as Klein wouldn’t have bothered to inform her about any interests Perini had in bidding on work from, say, the Louisiana government.

He hasn’t responded.end new material

Second allegation: In the 2002 MILCON hearings, Feinstein questioned an official about details of the U.S. Army’s chemical demilitarization program. URS is extensively involved in performing chemical demilitarization work at key disposal sites in the United States.

At the March 5, 2002, hearing of the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Subcommittee, Feinstein submitted the following question, in writing (not orally), to Mario P. Fiori, Assistant Secretary of the Army:

Question. Dr. Fiori, the President’s budget requests $168 million for the Defense Department’s Chemical Demilitarization Program in fiscal year 2003. Yet, in an evaluation from the Office of Management and Budget accompanying the fiscal year 2003 budget, the program was rated “ineffective” because of a 60 percent cost increase estimate and delays stemming from “unrealistic schedules, site safety and environmental concerns, and poor planning.” That evaluation doesn’t give me a lot confidence that the budget request is justified or will be well spent.

Since it is the Army that administers that program, could you please comment on the budget evaluation and tell us what your department is doing to improve the chem-demil program?

Byrne omits any reference to the substance of the question. Any fair minded reader would agree that the question indicates that Feinstein does not want to spend more money on the program, and that what money has been spent has been spent badly. It doesn’t seem like that would benefit URS.

Third allegation: At that same hearing, Feinstein asked about the possibility of increasing funding for anti-terrorism-force protection at Army bases. The following year, on March 4, 2003, Feinstein asked why the antiterrorism-force protection funds she had advocated for the year before had not yet been spent. On April 21, 2003, URS announced the award of a $600 million contract to provide, among other services, anti-terrorism-force protection for U.S. Army installations.

At the March 5, 2002, heaing, Feinstein submitted a single, written question about anti-terrorism force-protection (available, as above, here) that reads:

Question. General Helmly and General Squier. I see no specific requests in the budgets of the reserve components addressing increased force protection requirements. However, understanding that this amount could be in the billions of dollars, the Army Guard has made an initial cut as to the amount that could be executed in the next fiscal year. I assume the USAR has a similar estimate. Would you please provide your estimated requirement for the Committee?

Feinstein does not ask for increased funding–she asks for specific information on funding. And, to be clear, the “increased funding” to which she refers comes from President George Bush’s budget request. This is from the House Report on the 2003 Military Construction Bill:

The President’s fiscal year 2003 budget request includes $20,055,000,000 for the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) account to support DOD’s efforts to respond to and protect against terrorist acts on the United States. Of the amount, $594,384,000 is to address anti-terrorism/force protection vulnerabilities at installations worldwide. Though requested in the fiscal year 2003 Defense Appropriations legislation, these projects fall under the jurisdiction of the Military Construction Appropriations Subcommittee. To reflect properly these requirements in the fiscal year 2003 budget, the Committee has subtracted the request from the Defense Appropriations bill and added it to this appropriations measure.

And here’s the written question on Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection from the March 4, 2004, hearing:

Question. It is my understanding that funding previously approved by the Committee for Antiterrorism/Force Protection (ATFP) is not finding its way to the reserve components. Could you provide the Committee with your funding plan for ATFP?

Answer. As it pertains to military construction force protection projects, the Army National Guard has validated requirements of $1.952 million in fiscal year 2004 for planning and design of future year construction of antiterrorism/force protection related projects. In addition, each military construction project routinely incorporates all necessary antiterrorism/force protection features. These requirements are funded as part of the military construction project. The Army National Guard continues to work with the active Army to further validate their increased force protection requirements.

The Army Reserve has not identified any requirement for military construction projects that are exclusively for antiterrorism/force protection. However, each military construction project incorporates all necessary antiterrorism/force protection features. The Army Reserve antiterrorism/force protection projects at existing facilities will be funded with Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve appropriations.

As for the URS Corp. contract, the April 21, 2003, URS Corp. press release to which Byrne refers clearly states that what the contract that its subsidiary, EG&G , won:

Under the terms of the contract, EG&G will provide support services for operations planning, troop mobilization planning and execution, training services for weapon systems, antiterrorist assessment and force protection training for Army installations.

Are training and construction the same thing?

Fourth allegation: Beginning in 2003, both Perini and URS were awarded a series of open-ended contracts for military construction work around the world, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. Under Feinstein’s leadership, MILCON regularly approved specific project “task orders” that were issued to Perini and URS under these contracts.

“Task orders” are not awarded by congressional committees, but by executive branch agencies that issue contracts (see here for this definition:

Task order contracts are enormously adaptable contracting instruments used by a growing number of Government agencies — allowing agencies to enter into contracts before their specific service/product requirements are known. A task order contract obligates a contractor to render services or deliver products as ordered from time to time. Thus, the award of the contract puts the contractor on standby. The contract statement of work is a general description of the service or product the contractor will be obligated to produce on demand. And after the contract award, the Government buyer will issue, when needed, task orders to specify specific, detailed requirements.

Beyond that, there is no specific example cited here. No correspondence from Feinstein’s office. No citation of an earmark inserted for one of these two companies.

New material:Peter Byrne writes,

You appear to be unfamiliar with the military construction appropriation process. Otherwise you would know that “task orders” on existing open-ended IDIQ contracts are often submitted to MILCON by the DOD on 1391 forms. If you do not know how to access those forms online, despite your career as an investigative journalist (now cut short, in my humble opinion, by your going to work for a non-profit lobby group, the Sunshine Foundation, which is funded by an Iraq war contractor with close business and personal ties to Feinstein and her husband, Richard Blum), I will be glad to give you a lesson in how to search public records.

I may well be wrong here, but my sense remains that agencies approve task orders, that task orders are parts of contracts, and that the committees approve something else (forms 1391, perhaps). But I may well be incorrect about the terminology. In any case, I emailed Byrne the following:

You mention signing off on contracts for Perini in Afghanistan and Iraq–here’s the passage:

Beginning in 2003, both Perini and URS were awarded a series of open-ended contracts for military construction work around the world, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. Under Feinstein’s leadership, MILCON regularly approved specific project “task orders” that were issued to Perini and URS under these contracts.

I couldn’t help noticing the construction. You don’t say that Feinstein regularly voted to approve specific project “task orders” for Perini (about which she should have been tipped off), you say under her leadership (when she would actually have been the ranking member, not the chair), the committee regularly approved them. So what is Feinstein supposed to have done wrong here? How does this support the charge (where we began the section) that Feinstein “did act on legislation” in which Perini had an interest? I’m not trying to badger you, I’m just trying to understand what you think this paragraph is suggesting.

In his final email to me, Byrne responded that I was annoying him, and added:

Feinstein was the chair of milcon until the repubs took the congress, remember?

To which I replied,

The Republicans retook the Senate in the 2002 elections.

Your article says, “Beginning in 2003, both Perini and URS were awarded a series of open-ended contracts for military construction work around the world, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. Under Feinstein’s leadership, MILCON regularly approved specific project “task orders” that were issued to Perini and URS under these contracts.”

I’m sorry if pointing out things that seem to me to be inaccurate bothers you–that’s not my intention. I’m trying to understand what your article means and why you wrote it the way you did.

He chose not to respond. end new material

Fifth allegation: At a March 30, 2004, MILCON hearing, Feinstein grilled Maj. Gen. Dean Fox about whether or not the Pentagon intended to prioritize funding the construction of “beddown” maintenance facilities for its new airlifter, the C-17 Globemaster. After being reassured by Fox that these funds would soon be flowing, Feinstein said, “Good, that’s what I really wanted to hear. Thank you very much. Appreciate it very much, General.” Two years later, URS announced a $42 million award to build a beddown maintenance facility for the C-17 at Hickam Air Base in Hawaii as part of a multibillion dollar contract with the Air Force. Under Feinstein’s leadership, MILCON approved the Hickam project.

At the hearing, Feinstein asks about funding for C-17 beddowns at Vandenberg Air Force Base and Travis Air Force Base, both of which are in California. Here is the whole exchange:

Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman, and thank you gentlemen for your service. I just want to assure that the bed down costs for the C-17 and the C-5 transformation are in the FYDP, aren’t they?

Mr. Gibbs. To the extent that we know them, yes, ma’am.

Senator Feinstein. Okay. To the extent that you know them, right. So the commitment is to put them in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). I recognize that in the 2005 bill we have two facility projects, two at Travis for $15 million, and two projects for $10 billion at March. So I think that California is going to be very happy about that, and we thank you for that.

Mr. Gibbs. That’s one of the earlier locations.

Senator Feinstein. Pardon me?

Mr. Gibbs. That’s one of the earlier locations from the list that the Chairman read.

General Fox. Senator Feinstein, if I can answer. The way that we prioritize our military construction program, when we bring in a new weapon system like the C-17 to California we will ensure that those requirements are funded up front in our President’s budget submission.

Senator Feinstein. Good, that’s what I really wanted to hear. Thank you very much. Appreciate it very much, General.

How any of this relates to the URS Corp. winning a contract to provide C-17 a beddown at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii in 2006, two years after the hearing, is not clear. Feinstein does not mention the Hickam, Hawaii, base at the hearing—-nor does anyone else.

Sixth allegation: In mid-2005, MILCON approved a Pentagon proposal to fund “overhead coverage force protection” in Iraq that would reinforce the roofs of U.S. Army barracks to better withstand mortar rounds. On Oct. 13, 2005, Perini announced the award of a $185 million contract to provide overhead coverage force protection to the Army in Iraq.

Apparently, Feinstein need not be mentioned to imply nefarious actions on her part.

Seventh allegation: In the 2005 MILCON hearings, Feinstein earmarked MILCON legislation with $25 million to increase environmental remediation at closed military bases. Year after year, Feinstein has closely overseen the environmental cleanup and redevelopment of McClellan Air Force Base near Sacramento, frequently requesting that officials add tens of millions of dollars to that project. URS and its joint ventures have earned tens of millions of dollars cleaning up McClellan. And CB Richard Ellis, a real estate company headed by Feinstein’s husband Richard Blum, is involved in redeveloping McClellan for the private sector.

McLellan AFB is a Superfund site and is on the EPA’s National Priorities List (click on California). Here’s a brief description of the site from the EPA:

The 2,952-acre McClellan Air Force Base (McAFB) site was established in 1936 and operated as an Air Force Logistics Command Base with a primary mission of management, maintenance, and repair of aircraft, electronics, and communication equipment. The operation and maintenance of aircraft have involved the use, storage, and disposal of hazardous materials including industrial solvents, caustic cleansers, paints, metal plating wastes, low-level radioactive wastes, and a variety of fuel oils and lubricants. The Air Force has identified 326 waste areas and potential release locations divided into 10 operable units. Approximately 22,800 people live within a 3-mile radius of the site.

And here’s a description of what’s there:

Groundwater, sludge, and soil have been contaminated with volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Surface soils have been contaminated with PCBs, heavy metals, and a wide range of non-VOCs. People may face a health risk if they accidentally ingest or come into direct contact with contaminants. People also may be at risk if they eat foods containing accumulated contaminants or if they inhale contaminated dust and soil vapors. Risks to wildlife and their habitat may occur on and adjacent to the former base in some areas of the creeks, vernal pools, and other parts of the flood plain.

Oh, and here’s the question Feinstein submitted in writing:

Question. General Fox, the Air Force plans to spend $34.7 million in fiscal year 2006 for environmental remediation at the former McClellan AFB. Could you please tell me, what is the extent of remediation efforts still required at McClellan, how much time and how much funding is still required?

Answer. Former McClellan AFB is on the EPA National Priorities List (NPL) list and is a very complex environmental site. There are nine operable units, which have been organized into 15 specific Records of Decision (RODs). Two RODs are completed. 2010 is the projected Final ROD date, with 2015 being the final remedy in place date. The Estimated Cost to Complete is $752 million. The Air Force is seeking to implement alternate contracting methods to buyout all or portions of the environmental program over the FYDP. Currently 11 percent of the property is conveyed. All conveyances are estimated for completion by end of 2016.

I couldn’t find any reference in the hearing transcript to Feinstein’s earmarking $25 million for closed bases; how that relates to McClellan is not clear.

Eighth allegation: At a 2001 MILCON hearing, Feinstein, attending to a small item, told Maj. Gen. Earnest O. Robbins that she would appreciate receiving an engineering assessment on plans to build a missile transport bridge at Vandenberg Air Force Base. He said he would give it to her. She also asked for and received a list of unfunded construction projects, which prioritize military construction wish lists down to the level of thousand-dollar light fixtures. While there is no evidence to point to nefarious intent behind Feinstein’s request for these details, it is worth noting that Perini and URS have open-ended contracts to perform military construction for the Air Force.

Here’s the exchange on the bridge:

Senator Feinstein. Pretty good fitness center. The budget also includes $11.8 million for Vandenberg to construct a missile transport bridge. According to the project description, the bridge is used for transporting Minuteman and Peacekeeper missile. Again, would a decision to retire the Peacekeeper have any impact on the need for this project?

General Robbins. That also would remain a requirement. That road is the only road between the north and south portions of the base. As you noted, it transports both Peacekeeper and Minuteman missiles for test firing, and so the elimination of one of those systems would not matter.

Senator Feinstein. Is this an improvement of the existing road?

General Robbins. It is replacement of an existing bridge.

Senator Feinstein. So it’s a new road.

General Robbins. Bridge.

Senator Feinstein. Bridge. I beg your pardon. As a replacement for an existing bridge?

General Robbins. That’s correct.

Senator Feinstein. And the existing bridge cannot be fixed?

General Robbins. Correct.

Senator Feinstein. Why?

General Robbins. I’ll have to get you the engineering assessment on it.

Senator Feinstein. Would you please? I would appreciate that very much.

From the exchange, it’s fairly clear that Feinstein is questioning a) whether the new bridge is needed and b) why can’t the current one be repaired.

And, a general comment: “no evidence” is a phrase that should have been recurring throughout the article.

The most charitable thing one can say about Byrne is that he has confused what may be an appearance of a conflict of interest with actual wrongdoing. It’s a shame that so many bloggers have taken it at face value.

—–Original Message—– From: iallison@comcast.net [mailto:iallison@comcast.net] Sent: Monday, May 07, 2007 12:53 AM To: Bill Allison Cc: iallison@comcast.net Subject: original post

(Note: After posting this piece, I had a back and forth email conversation with Peter Byrne. I am adding information he provided, in his words, and responding as well. New material can be found by searching for the words “new material”. I also moved the disclosure statement to the top of the post.)

One of the few downsides of the Internet age is that inaccurate information and completely unsubstantiated allegations can be dressed up as an “investigative” expose and then be recycled over and over, regardless of how wildly unfounded they are. Such is the case with this piece that ran in some small California weeklies that, on the basis of what appears to be no evidence at all, alleges serious ethical improprieties by Sen. Dianne Feinstein. The story has been recycled by David Keene, who writes a column for the Hill, and subsequently picked up by various blogs. I should note right away (this disclosure was originally at the bottom of this lengthy piece) that I got interested in this story because it prominently mentions the Sunlight Foundation’s co-founder, Michael Klein. Mike can speak for himself (as he already did in response to the article). I limited my review to the central allegation of the article, and asked whether I as an editor would publish it on the basis of the evidence presented. I wouldn’t.

The piece’s author, a freelance journalist named Peter Byrne, alleges that, “Two defense contractors whose interests were largely controlled by her husband, financier Richard C. Blum, benefited from decisions made by Feinstein as leader” of the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Subcommittee (MILCON), part of the Senate Appropriatins Committee. To substantiate this allegation, he misrepresents or mischaracterizes both the transcripts of MILCON hearings, and information gleaned from the Web sites and press releases of the companies in question. He consistently distorts the plain meaning of words or omits key information and context in his effort to suggest scandal. But don’t believe me — read the rest for yourself, and see whether Byrne’s central allegation — “Two defense contractors whose interests were largely controlled by her husband, financier Richard C. Blum, benefited from decisions made by Feinstein as leader” of MILCON — can be substantiated by the examples Byrne cites. Unlike the publication for which he wrote his article, I’m providing links to all the committee transcripts and press releases and other information I cite. I leave it to readers to draw their own conclusions.

First allegation: At a MILCON hearing in 2001, Feinstein interrogated defense officials about the details of constructing specific missile defense systems, which included upgrading the early warning radar system at Cobra Dane radar on Shemya Island, Alaska. In 2003, Perini reported that it had completed a contract to upgrade the Cobra Dane radar system. It has done similar work at Beale Air Force Base in California and in the United Kingdom. URS also bids on missile defense work.

Byrne leaves out a great deal of information about this subject that appears in the hearing transcript, most importantly, that the money to pay for the project would come out the Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RTD&E) budget, not MILCON:

Senator Feinstein. I wanted to begin, if I might, with Dr. Sanders. I understand there are no MILCON funds for Fort Greely in the 2002 budget; is that correct?

Dr. Sanders. That is correct.

Senator Feinstein. But there are funds in the 2001 budget?

Dr. Sanders. That is correct.

Senator Feinstein. Could you explain to me why a decision was made to use research and development funds instead of MILCON to construct the missile defense testbed which is now going to be at the initial deployment site at Fort Greely?

Dr. Sanders. The Department believes that the testbed facility should be funded with RDT&E, reflecting the reality that the testbed is a research and development effort, and as such the cost of constructing the testbed should be included in the cost as a research and development cost of developing a ground-based midcourse missile defense system. The RDT&E funding will provide the needed flexibility to make the required changes to the testbed that we identify through testing in this realistic environment.

Later in the same hearing, we learn that the Shemya Island facility will be funded with RDT&E funds:

Dr. Sanders. We have really determined that aspects of the testbed project clearly fall within Title 10, Code 2353 authority, and use of and RDT&E funding would be authorized. There are some aspects of the testbed that could be viewed as having general utility and therefore are not authorized for RDT&E funding. But neither the statute nor the legislative history have a clear definition of “general utility.” So in order to clarify that, the Department has proposed legislation that would clarify the authority to construct a testbed to include some facilities that might be considered general utility with RDT&E funds.

Senator Feinstein. What are those facilities?

Dr. Sanders. The ones that might be considered general utility?

Senator Feinstein. Right.

Dr. Sanders. I would hesitate to say right now because that is an ambiguous area, but it could be, for example, at one aspect of the testbed it is an upgrade to the radar, the Cobra Dane radar in Shemya, the upgrade to the radar’s software. It is not even a construction element. But there is an upgrade to the power plant needed there in order to support that radar, and that might or might not be considered general utility.

Byrne didn’t bother to check it, but the MILCON committee approved the shift to RDT&E for the missile defense program:

To help make up the services’ urgent shortfall in funding, the Committee recommends that the unobligated balance of $55,030,000 remaining in the fiscal year 2001 Defense-wide account, “National Missile Defense Initial Deployment Facilities Phase 1,” be rescinded and that the funds be reallocated to the base realignment and closure account, part IV, specifically to offset the Navy and Air Force BRAC environmental shortfalls. The Committee recommends this offset as a result of the Department’s decision to shift the proposed national missile defense construction program from military construction into research, test, development, and evaluation.

It is also worth noting that the contract to upgrade the Shemya Island facility was awarded to Raytheon, not Perini Corporation. Did Feinstein also have influence over the decisions that contractors made about their subcontractors?

Raytheon hired Perini for both Shemya Island and the Beale Air Force Base projects, which can clearly be read here:

Perini Corporation has completed design and construction contracts for Raytheon Electronic Systems at Beale Air Force Base in California, the Cobra Dane facility on Shemya Island, Alaska and at a radar facility in England. The projects are all part of the Upgraded Early Warning Radar Element of the overall Ground-based Midcourse Defense program.

Perini applyied directly to Raytheon, not the federal government, for the work. And “Ground-Based Midcourse Defense program” is another name for missile defense–again, paid for with RDT&E funds, not those from MILCON.

New Material: This was probably the most contentious single item raised during our email exchange. Byrne argued MILCON approved requests for funding submitted on 1391 forms — which are detailed requests f\from the military that omit the names of contractors — for Cobra Dane and Beale Air Force Base. He also told me that he wrote a sidebar on this subject, rejected for publication, which he offered to share it with me on background, an offer he soon withdrew:

i am not going to give you the sidebar, but just so you know, so that you can better do your own homework: the milcon-approved cobra dane and beale missile defense systems, as Saunders [SIC] indicated, were funded by milcon, not r&d funds. without seeing the 1391 forms you probably wouldn’t have been able to figure that out. not that any of this matters in terms of what i wrote, because the point is that the seantor was involved in deciding how to fund these projects, and the rest is history.

I will happily admit error on the budget issue as soon as I see the forms 1391; however, since Raytheon was the prime contractor seeking the Cobra Dane business, I’m still not sure why this is an issue. And did Sanders say the budget request as coming from MILCON, or RDT&E? end new material

Second allegation: In the 2002 MILCON hearings, Feinstein questioned an official about details of the U.S. Army’s chemical demilitarization program. URS is extensively involved in performing chemical demilitarization work at key disposal sites in the United States.

At the March 5, 2002, hearing of the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Subcommittee, Feinstein submitted the following question, in writing (not orally), to Mario P. Fiori, Assistant Secretary of the Army:

Question. Dr. Fiori, the President’s budget requests $168 million for the Defense Department’s Chemical Demilitarization Program in fiscal year 2003. Yet, in an evaluation from the Office of Management and Budget accompanying the fiscal year 2003 budget, the program was rated “ineffective” because of a 60 percent cost increase estimate and delays stemming from “unrealistic schedules, site safety and environmental concerns, and poor planning.” That evaluation doesn’t give me a lot confidence that the budget request is justified or will be well spent.

Since it is the Army that administers that program, could you please comment on the budget evaluation and tell us what your department is doing to improve the chem-demil program?

Byrne omits any reference to the substance of the question. Any fair minded reader would agree that the question indicates that Feinstein does not want to spend more money on the program, and that what money has been spent has been spent badly. It doesn’t seem like that would benefit URS.

Third allegation: At that same hearing, Feinstein asked about the possibility of increasing funding for anti-terrorism-force protection at Army bases. The following year, on March 4, 2003, Feinstein asked why the antiterrorism-force protection funds she had advocated for the year before had not yet been spent. On April 21, 2003, URS announced the award of a $600 million contract to provide, among other services, anti-terrorism-force protection for U.S. Army installations.

At the March 5, 2002, heaing, Feinstein submitted a single, written question about anti-terrorism force-protection (available, as above, here) that reads:

Question. General Helmly and General Squier. I see no specific requests in the budgets of the reserve components addressing increased force protection requirements. However, understanding that this amount could be in the billions of dollars, the Army Guard has made an initial cut as to the amount that could be executed in the next fiscal year. I assume the USAR has a similar estimate. Would you please provide your estimated requirement for the Committee?

Feinstein does not ask for increased funding–she asks for specific information on funding. And, to be clear, the “increased funding” to which she refers comes from President George Bush’s budget request. This is from the House Report on the 2003 Military Construction Bill:

The President’s fiscal year 2003 budget request includes $20,055,000,000 for the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) account to support DOD’s efforts to respond to and protect against terrorist acts on the United States. Of the amount, $594,384,000 is to address anti-terrorism/force protection vulnerabilities at installations worldwide. Though requested in the fiscal year 2003 Defense Appropriations legislation, these projects fall under the jurisdiction of the Military Construction Appropriations Subcommittee. To reflect properly these requirements in the fiscal year 2003 budget, the Committee has subtracted the request from the Defense Appropriations bill and added it to this appropriations measure.

And here’s the written question on Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection from the March 4, 2004, hearing:

Question. It is my understanding that funding previously approved by the Committee for Antiterrorism/Force Protection (ATFP) is not finding its way to the reserve components. Could you provide the Committee with your funding plan for ATFP?

Answer. As it pertains to military construction force protection projects, the Army National Guard has validated requirements of $1.952 million in fiscal year 2004 for planning and design of future year construction of antiterrorism/force protection related projects. In addition, each military construction project routinely incorporates all necessary antiterrorism/force protection features. These requirements are funded as part of the military construction project. The Army National Guard continues to work with the active Army to further validate their increased force protection requirements.

The Army Reserve has not identified any requirement for military construction projects that are exclusively for antiterrorism/force protection. However, each military construction project incorporates all necessary antiterrorism/force protection features. The Army Reserve antiterrorism/force protection projects at existing facilities will be funded with Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve appropriations.

As for the URS Corp. contract, the April 21, 2003, URS Corp. press release to which Byrne refers clearly states that what the contract that its subsidiary, EG&G , won:

Under the terms of the contract, EG&G will provide support services for operations planning, troop mobilization planning and execution, training services for weapon systems, antiterrorist assessment and force protection training for Army installations.

Are training and construction the same thing?

Fourth allegation: Beginning in 2003, both Perini and URS were awarded a series of open-ended contracts for military construction work around the world, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. Under Feinstein’s leadership, MILCON regularly approved specific project “task orders” that were issued to Perini and URS under these contracts.

“Task orders” are not awarded by congressional committees, but by executive branch agencies that issue contracts (see here for this definition:

Task order contracts are enormously adaptable contracting instruments used by a growing number of Government agencies — allowing agencies to enter into contracts before their specific service/product requirements are known. A task order contract obligates a contractor to render services or deliver products as ordered from time to time. Thus, the award of the contract puts the contractor on standby. The contract statement of work is a general description of the service or product the contractor will be obligated to produce on demand. And after the contract award, the Government buyer will issue, when needed, task orders to specify specific, detailed requirements.

Beyond that, there is no specific example cited here. No correspondence from Feinstein’s office. No citation of an earmark inserted for one of these two companies.

New material:Peter Byrne writes,